Bureaucracy as a political phenomenon

Authors

  • O.V. Batrymenko Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка
  • O.I. Tkach Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31558/2617-0248.2024.9.12

Keywords:

decision-making process in the EU, bureaucracy, bureaucracy, bureaucratic regime, democracy

Abstract

This article is devoted to the analysis of bureaucracy as a political phenomenon. It was found out that, bureaucracy arose together with the emergence of the state and the division of society into those who govern and those who are governed. Management requires certain regulations (laws), which must be obeyed by both management structures in accordance with the hierarchy and all strata of the population, which creates an appropriate management-executive system. Such a system becomes the main factor in the formation and reproduction of bureaucracy. Researched that, but in different political and economic systems, the bureaucracy gets specific "colors". First of all, the essence of bureaucracy and its features are influenced by the degree of control by society, which depends on its political and cultural level. Many thinkers and scientists of different eras and periods considered the problem of "power" and "management", "rulers" and "subordinates".
In accordance with the defined object, subject of research and set tasks, a certain methodology is introduced, which involves the use of several methods and approaches. And the historical method made it possible to investigate the genesis of bureaucracy and identify the main points in its development. The sociological method made it possible to find out the influence of bureaucracy on the political system of society. The functional method was used to analyze the relationship between political phenomena in real reality. The behaviorist method was used to study various behaviors from the point of view of the politics of individual individuals and groups. The system method made it possible to consider the bureaucracy as an integrated political and social phenomenon.
The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is the classical principles of bureaucracy analysis, which were developed by K. Marx, M. Weber, and R. Michels.
It is emphasized that, this problem was considered by Confucianism, based on the teachings of the Chinese scholar Confucius. For many centuries, Confucianism was the religion of the Chinese bureaucratic class – mandarins or educated people, whose administrative posts were replaced on the basis of competitive examinations of so-called classical knowledge.

Author Biographies

O.V. Batrymenko , Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка

д. політ. н., професор, зав. кафедри

O.I. Tkach , Київський національний університет імені Тараса Шевченка

д. політ. н., професор

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Published

2024-10-09

Issue

Section

Theory and history of political science