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DOI 10.31558/2617-0248.2023.8.19

UDK 323:37.01:172.4(470+477)

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AS A SUBJECT OF WORLD-SYSTEM ANALYSIS

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The article raises the question that it is time to consider such a large-scale and tragic phenomenon as the Russian-Ukrainian war, not only in the context of media journalism, but also in the context of a deep theoretical analysis based on a well-developed methodology.

As a working model, authors propose the world-system analysis, developed by I. Wallerstein and a group of his like-minded colleges.

The authors of this article compare the conceptual content of world-system analysis with the most popular methodologies, such as: Marxism; the concept of S. Huntington's "clash of civilizations", the theory of "civilizational waves" by E. Toffler, "historical finalism" by F. Fukuyama, "American-centric globalism" by Z. Brzezinski, the arguments of modern postmodernists.

Following the I. Wallerstein's logic, the authors consider the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of a chain of world wars, starting from the "Thirty-years" world war of the 17th century and ending with the "Cold war" (with collapse of the USSR). The authors come to the conclusion that each of these wars turned out to be a world-system "upgrade point" and a "change phase" of the global hegemon. On this basis, they raise the question of methodologically justified forecasting of the world-system future. They draw attention to Wallerstein's idea of world (so-called "thirty-years wars") as "phases of the world system renewal", and "procedures for the hegemon change".

The authors emphasize that such a grandiose and terrible phenomenon as the Russian-Ukrainian war deserves a much deeper thoughtful approach than that which is observed by many of today's "hype masters". This war is a great tragedy, a great challenge and a great harbinger of the new unprecedented global change.

The authors call for the broad scientific discourse organization around this problem. At the same time, they formulate the object, subject, goals and objectives of such a discourse.

Keywords: world-system analysis, world war, Russian-Ukrainian war, world order, world-system.

Попков В. В., Фуад Хамід Російсько-українська війна як предмет мир-системного аналізу

У статті порушується питання, про необхідність розглядати таке масштабне і трагічне явище, як російсько-українська війна, не тільки у контексті медійної публіцистики, але й у контексті глибокого теоретичного аналізу з урахуванням якісно розробленої методології.

У якості робочої моделі автори пропонують звернутися до світ-системного аналізу, який був розроблений І. Валлерстайном та групою його однодумців.

Наслідуючи логіку І. Валлерстайна, автори розглядають російсько-українську війну в контексті ланцюжка світових воєн, починаючи з «Тридцятирічної» світової війни XVII століття і закінчуючи «Холодною» війною (з розпадом СРСР). Автори приходять до висновку, що кожна з цих воєн виявилася "точкою апгрейду" світ-системи та «фазою зміни глобального гегемона». На цій основі вони порушують питання про методологічно обґрунтоване прогнозування майбутнього світ-системи. Вони звертають увагу на ідею Валлерстайна про світові (так звані «тридцятирічні війни») як «фази оновлення» світ-системи та «процедури зміни» гегемона.

Автори підкреслюють, що таке грандіозне і страшне явище, як російсько-українська війна, заслуговує на набагато глибший вдумливий підхід, ніж той, який спостерігається у багатьох сьогодишніх дискурсах. Ця війна є великою трагедією, великим викликом і великим провісником нових безпрецедентних глобальних змін.

Автори закликають до організації широкого наукового дискурсу довкола цієї проблеми. При цьому вони формулюють об'єкт, предмет, цілі та завдання такого дискурсу.

Ключові слова: світ-системний аналіз, світова війна, російсько-українська війна, світовий порядок, світ-система.

Introduction. The Russian-Ukrainian war has become a newsworthy event of great importance. Such a powerful information "explosion" has not been even since the New York "twin towers" air ramming (2001), the US invasion of Iraq (2003), or the rapid "reconquest" of the Taliban in Afghanistan (2021).

Now it is high time to consider such a huge and tragic phenomenon as the Russian-Ukrainian war not in the context of media sensations, but in the context of a deep theoretical analysis based on a well-developed methodology.

Viewpoints comparison. Sifting through informational spam, one can single out several more or less intelligible interpretations of the Russian-Ukrainian war with the establishment of its occurrence causes, its role in the global political process and the historical meaning of everything that is happening now.

Let us examine, for example, two approaches, two points of view, which to some extent express the external (from the standpoint of US analysts) and internal (from the standpoint of Ukrainian analysts) versions of this bloody war. On the one hand, let's consider the arguments of Harvard University professor Joseph S. Nye, and on the other hand, the thoughts of the Ukrainian public organization "Ukrainian Institute of Politics" head Ruslan Bortnick.

Joseph Nye divides the Russian-Ukrainian war causes into three groups. These are a) *deep* (remote in time) causes, b) *medium-term*, and c) *immediate* factors.

Among the *deep-seated* causes of the war, Nye refers to Putin's (as the representative of the Russian political elite ruling part) disappointment in the West sincerity and the extent of Western assistance to Russia.

He refers to the *medium-term* (intermediate) reasons: Russia's awareness of NATO's insincerity, which reduced to empty rhetoric, promises not to expand to the East and include Russia in the North Atlantic Alliance on the equality and mutual respect basis.

Among the *immediate* motives for starting the war, Nye refers to Putin's personal intolerance to the very fact of the USSR collapse, which, by his own definition, is "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century." This motive is enforced by Putin's intolerant attitude towards independent states that have formed along survived after the USSR collapse Russian perimeter. In all of them (including Ukraine) he sees only "fail states".

At the same time, Nye emphasizes that the Russian-Ukrainian war was not predetermined. It's just that on February 24, 2022, Putin made a mistake in his own calculations and "lit a match" that could (by his own will) remain in the box. That is, Putin's immediate motive turned out to be the decisive "trigger" [Look: 1].

It is easy to see that in the Harvard professor's arguments there is analysis of enumeration of "grievances", "disappointments", "rejections", "intolerances" – everything that belongs to the subjective sphere. The reader here will not see the objective socio-economic sources of the broken out "inconceivable" military clash.

We can catch something else in the Ukrainian author Ruslan Bortnick assumptions. From his point of view, the initiators of the clash deliberately went to unleash a regional "controlled" war. The same "special war", which is carried out with a high degree of intensity, but without crossing the extremal "red lines". Such a war could, from Bortnick's point of view, "let off steam" of enormous pressure, which can burst the world financial and economic system. In favor of such a judgment, the author cites data that by 2022 the amount of money printed on average was 3.5 times more, than the GDP of all countries (the level of world GDP in 2021 was \$94 trillions). That is, a giant, unsecured financial bubble appeared, and it must be eliminated.

This process has intensified in the Covid-19 epidemic context. Then governments around the world (especially in the dollar and euro zone) "turned on the printing press". They did this to "soften" the economic consequences of the pandemic. Thus, the processes of stagflation (inflation with a slowdown economic growth combination) were launched.

Today, in the context of the pandemic and the Central European war outbreak, the authorities of many countries are returning to the former, tougher, but also clearer (from the past times) management and control forms. Almost everywhere there is a steady increase restrictions on human rights and freedoms. The role of public opinion leaders is declining, including the current so-called "digital Influencers". It is noteworthy that this happens with the crowd "stormy applause".

This circumstance is explained by the fact that the main values in the first quarter of the 21-st century are not "freedom", but "security" – personal and social. This is largely due to the decline in the public opinion leader's prestige, all kinds of "idly-broadcasting" persons of free professions, freelancers, gender activists, fiery fighters against "all sorts of restrictions". On this background, the "people of order" (party functionaries, lawyers, administrators, security officials) value is growing. According to R. Bortnick, the world is now ripe for transformation ... into some kind of new political and economic system [Look: 2].

Possibility of a new political and economic system... Such a forecast is very close to the world development process diagnosis, which was made at the end of the 20th century by I. Wallerstein with his world-system methodology.

The essence of world-system analysis. First of all, let us recall a few, in our opinion, significant points in the Immanuel Wallerstein's (1930 – 2019) creative biography. Professor and for a long time Fernand Braudel Center director (Studies of Economics, Historical Systems and Civilizations) at the New York State University (Binghamton, USA). Author of fundamental research on historical systems analysis. About 50 years ago, I. Wallerstein published "The Modern World-System", his main work (1974). His further works developed and detailed the embodied in this study main ideas [Look: 3].

The features and advantages of this methodological approach can be most clearly identified when compared with the most influential paradigms that matter to this day. We are talking about the Marxist "change of socio-economic formations" theory, about the "clash of civilizations" concept by S. Huntington, about the "civilizational waves" chain by E. Toffler, about the F. Fukuyama's "historical finalism", about the "American-centric globalism" by Z. Brzezinski, about the modernity and postmodernity concepts at the 20th – 21st centuries turn.

World-system analysis: overcoming Marxism. Although Wallerstein is considered by many to be a neo-Marxist, he at himself was opposed to the traditional Marxist "formational" approach to history. Wallerstein did not perceive history as a kind of hard "escalator" of steps moving upwards from the primitive social system to the "pinnacle of history" – the communist formation. History in his interpretation is a multiversal complex, mutating stream, in which all sorts of random turbulences arise, and some of them can become quite stable. Among such turbulences, he refers to the capitalist world-economy and world-system, based on it. In contrast to Marx's "socio-economic formation", Wallerstein take the historical system as the basic concept of social analysis. He defines it as "a society, characterized by a division of labor within integrated production structures, a set of organizing principles and institutions, and a certain period of its existence" [look: 4]. Wallerstein considers the analysis of these historical systems to be the main task of sociologists. His method entered the scientific circulation under the name "world-system analysis". In the focus of world-system observation, the world appears as a certain systemic and structural whole, in which exist and act the entire set of separate, individual societies and states. If we follow organic allusions, we come to analogy with a body complex exclusively in which various individual self-sufficient organs realize their functions. They can more or less successfully exist and develop only by "working" in the whole organism context. [Look: 4, 5, 6, 7,].

World-system analysis and S. Huntington "clash of civilizations" theory. [Look: 8]. In the context of his methodological approach, Wallerstein perceives the supporters of historical development civilizational theory in two ways. On the one hand, he unconditionally recognized the cultural and civilizational diversity fact. He also recognized the obvious fact that the cultural and civilizational factor plays a huge role in shaping economic styles, political

relations, features of socialization, everyday life, etc. But, according to Wallerstein, they are not the determining factors of historical process. These determinants are embedded in the basic structure of world-economies and their derivatives – world-systems. It is from here the main challenges come, to which certain peoples, cultures and states try to give more or less effective answers.

World-system analysis and the "civilizational waves" theory by A. Toffler. A. Toffler (1928-2016) [Look: 9] belongs to the same generation as E. Wallerstein. Both emphasized external (in relation to sociocultural phenomena) determinants. However, if Toffler focuses on the technological factor (agrarian, industrial, information technologies), then Wallerstein sees the type of labor division as the main determinant (which can "master" global technological development in different ways). For example: the nature of the labor division in ancient China, which did not allow effective master of all the phenomenal Chinese technological innovations – gunpowder, compass, printing press, large-tonnage ships, etc. All this was mastered much later, but on a much larger technological scale, by the West, thanks to the spontaneously emerged (capitalist) type of labor division.

World-system analysis: a look at the F. Fukuyama's "end of the history". Fukuyama (b. 1952) belongs to a different generation than Toffler and Wallerstein. He is more than two decades younger than them. It is post-war generation of Americans. The same Americans who, after the US victory in the World War II and after the Cold War (with the USSR collapse), believed in the complete and final victory of American democracy all over the world. This largely explains the appearance of his popular book "The End of History and the last man" [Look: 10].

The argument of the "older generation" representative, I. Wallerstein, left no chance for the F. Fukuyama's "finalism". The application of the "Kondratiev's cycles" and F. Braudel's "centenary megacycles", the analysis of their mutual imposition, as well as the methodology of world-system analysis gave Wallerstein reason: if we talk about the "end of the history", then, we talk at least, about the end of the current 500-year world-system history. After the shifting of it a new historical megacycle may be opened. This means that F. Fukuyama's methodology is hardly applicable to the modern global political process's analysis.

World-system analysis and arguments of the American-centric globalist, Z. Brzezinski. As for Z. Brzezinski, in almost all of his main works [Look: 11, 12, 13] he has for a long time substantiated the United States historical inevitability and historical right to global dominance and global governance in the future for the entire 21st century..

However, this thesis collides with the antithesis of I. Wallerstein, who substantiates the inevitability of the end of American hegemony, like any other hegemonies in the course of world history. This circumstance at the end of his life was forced to admit the author of the sensational "Great Chessboard" himself. His latest book, "Strategic View", was full of statements about the preparations for some new stage in the world metamorphosis.

World-system analysis: experience of overcoming modernity and response to postmodernity. As for the main socio-philosophical trends of the last two centuries, Wallerstein has his own position here too. Progressivism, linearity – everything that was the essence of the rebellious XVII, XIX and even XX centuries, all these "Enlightenment values" were called into question. Modernism, the European New Age, with its belief in progress and the omnipotence of reason, has been replaced by the ironic and distrustful Postmodern. It marked a breakdown in the value system of modernism with its linear narratives. The watershed was the First World War. In the post-war atmosphere, the modernist belief in the triumph of reason gave way to "interpretive thinking" [Look: 14]. Homo Sapiens has been replaced by Homo Ludens. As social development continues in the 20th and 21st centuries, skepticism and cynicism capture ever wider gaps in the public consciousness. Today, postmodernism is not only the dominant mentality, but also the worldview of a significant part of humanity.

World-systems analysis is in this trend. But this is not an adaptation to the dominant intellectual tastes, but a theoretical statement of the obvious: everything that has happened and is happening in the real life of the world. World-system analysis shows that none of the set historical goals has been achieved. Not a single ambitious plan of the "historical leader" (Fuhrer, Duce, etc.) was embodied. The great "universal empire" of Alexander the Great fell apart immediately after his death, the brilliant Roman civilization dissolved in the elements of barbarian invasions, the Bonapartist project of the global "Empire of Enlightenment" collapsed. A hundred years later, the Leninist project of the "Worldwide Working People's Commune", Hitler's "Third Reich", the World System of Socialism collapsed into oblivion ... What's next?

Conclusions. Considering this bitter experience of all unfulfilled social projects without exception, the world-systems analysis does not enchant itself with pictures of another "bright future", some kind of another "happy end of history". It looks at reality through the eyes of Heraclitus, who perceived the world as an endless process of burning fire "by the measure of ignition and the measure of fading." These "ignitions" and "fadings" are inherent in the modern era no less than any other.

All this suggests that global world-system changes continue to "be in trend", as the main *object of social cognition*.

In this *object*, the *subject* that attracts the most attention stands out sharply, namely: the Russian-Ukrainian war as a trigger for world-systemic changes. What is the sense of this "inconceivable" war? What is its place in the world-system process? And what are its consequences in the near and distant future? Such are the questions that require reasonable and competent answers. The logic of this subject also dictates the setting of *the goal of the study*: to reveal the relationship between the Russian-Ukrainian war and the existing world system's "phases of transition".

In the process of moving towards this goal, it will be necessary to solve *the following tasks*:

First, to consider the Russian-Ukrainian war in the context of the World Wars history, within the process of emergence, evolution and the existing world system's apogee reaching. Here, of particular interest is Wallerstein's idea of world "thirty-year wars" as world-system's "upgrade phases" and "procedures for hegemon change".

In this aspect, is considerable the Thirty Years (Confessional) War (1618-1648), the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), the First World War (1914-1918), the Second World War (1939-1945), the Cold War (1946-1991) as "phases of the world-system transition".

Secondly, consider the world-system changes dynamics as a whole (from the moment of its inception – to the present day). That is, to test what new qualities the world-system acquires after the next "phase of transition" and what qualities it loses.

Thirdly, to find out the place, role and function of the next world-order, which shapes the world-system structure after the next "phase of transition" in the world war format.

Fourth, to analyze possible scenarios for the post-war world order formation in the first half of the 21st century and the further development of the world-system process.

Fifth, to analyze the possibility of implementing the Emmanuel Kant's formula about "eternal peace" in the modern "peace-system shift" conditions.

Returning to the beginning of this article, we emphasize once again: such a grandiose and terrible phenomenon as the Russian-Ukrainian war deserves a much deeper thoughtful approach than that observed by many of today's "hyip masters" and hunters for "fried". This war is a great tragedy, a great challenge and a great harbinger of new unprecedented global changes. The analysis of this phenomenon requires a high theoretical culture and methodological discipline, clear definition of the object and subject of research, conscious setting of research goals and objectives. Much here is given by the methods of world-system analysis, which were developed by I. Wallerstein and his like-minded surrounding.

It also defines the general parameters of a possible large-scale interactive scientific discourse. It remains to be hoped that representatives of various schools and trends, included into the modern political process, will respond to this challenge and come to conclusive meaningful solutions.

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